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Abstract 
This paper presents findings of an exploration into the sources of the association of age with attitude 
towards Scottish independence. Polls and surveys have repeatedly shown that the lower the age of a 
person, the higher is the likelihood of them favouring independence over other ways of ruling 
Scotland. Using Klandermans’ work on why people join social movements as theoretical framework, 
a binary logistic model of attitude towards independence was constructed (Nagelkerke R²=.21). In 
this model, cohort and lifecycle indicators were identified and used in separate models. It was found 
that the cohort model reduced the age group coefficients by about a third of their power, suggesting 
that cohort effects accounted for some of the observed age effects, while the age coefficients in the 
lifecycle model remained unchanged. While the association between attitude towards Scottish 
independence and age is weak, the fact that the results presented in this paper suggest that they are 
at least partly based on cohort differences means that support for Scottish independence may grow 
in the coming decades. 
 
Scottish independence – age – cohort –  lifecycle – logistic regression 
 
Introduction 
“Friends - we ARE Scotland’s independence generation. And our time is now” (Alex Salmond, 2013) - 
with these words Scotland’s First Minister and leader of the Scottish National Party (SNP) closed his 
address of the 2013 SNP Conference in Perth, in which he had delivered a wide array of arguments 
for voting in favour of Scottish independence in the referendum on 18th September 2014. Although 
he most likely did not intend to, he thereby indirectly raised an interesting question that has played 
a vital part in the discussions around the referendum: why do polls and surveys constantly report a 
significant variation of support for Scottish independence by age? Is there indeed something like a 
generational effect that influences people’s attitudes towards how Scotland should be ruled? While 
members of the Scottish parliament like Willie Rennie claim that lowering the voting age for the 
referendum to include 16 and 17 year-olds was “an important step in our efforts to build a fairer 
society”, it is commonly assumed that the SNP supported this move primarily because young voters 
tend to show higher rates of support for independence (Black 2013).  
Two distinct exploratory paths open up when regarding the effect of age on the attitude towards a 
split of Scotland from the UK: they could be based on lifecycle effects, stemming from the changes in 
socio-economic position of people in the course of their lives, or they could be fuelled by 
generational/cohort effects. These are commonly described as based on shared experiences, such as 
a particular economic or political climate, that leave a lasting impression on a group of people’s 
attitudes and behaviour. 
The Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (SSA) collects data on the attitudes of Scotland’s residents 
towards ideas associated with an independent Scotland in yearly cross-sectional surveys since 1999. 
In nearly all years, their likeliness of supporting those ideas was significantly associated with age. 
When asked how they think Scotland should be ruled, overall (with some variations over the years) 
about three out of ten respondents picked one of the two response options for a Scotland 
independent from the UK (within or apart from the EU); however, apart from the 2007 to 2010 
Scottish election period, when support for Scottish independence dropped in nearly all age groups, 
amongst the 18-24 year-olds, almost four out of ten respondents chose one of these response 
options (captured here in a computed dummy indicator for support of Scottish independence), while 
only about two out of every ten respondents over age 75 did so (Table 1). 
Table 1: rates of support for Scottish independence by age groups, summary for 1999-2012 
 Age categories in years 
Total   18-24 25-44 45-64 65-68 69-74 75+ 
respondents choosing 
Scottish independence 
over other ways of 
ruling Scotland 
38.4% 33.2% 29.2% 23.7% 21.4% 20.2% 30.0% 
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (SSA) 1999-2012 (excluding 2008); 5.5% (1,084) missing. 
Cramer’s V = .112. p<0.001. 
In 1999, shortly after the Scottish Parliament was established, SSA results showed that of the 
youngest part of the Scottish population eligible to vote, 47.8% favoured Scottish independence. 
After some decrease of these figures in the subsequent years, in 2004 over half of the 159 
representatives (50.9%) of the 18-24 age group gave this answer. However, a school based survey of 
1,018 respondents about the topic amongst 14 to 17 year-olds by Eichhorn et al. (2013) showed that 
these did not necessarily follow the trend that the SSA suggested: 60.3% were decidedly against 
Scotland being an independent country, while only 20.9% were clearly in favour of the idea and 
nearly a fifth were undecided. 
The question of the reason for the association of age with support for independence is relevant in 
two aspects: 
1. It gives an indication of how much the outcome of the referendum in September 2014 can 
be influenced: if there is a strong cohort effect at play, one would expect the outcome to be 
determined already. If, on the other hand, there is a lifecycle effect, some factors that have a 
strong association with a specific age groups’ attitude towards a split from the UK may yet 
change and consequently also change this age groups’ opinion on Scottish independence. 
2. What comes after the referendum? If the majority of voters votes against leaving the UK, 
this does not mean any idea of independence is forever going to be buried. And indeed, if 
there is a cohort or generational effect detectable, this would suggest better chances for this 
endeavour in the future: the older, more sceptical voters would eventually grow silent, and a 
new generation of people pro-independence would want to be heard. 
The following two graphs illustrate the lifecycle and the cohort perspective. They present age groups 
and cohort groups in their attitudinal development over time. To make them more easily readable, 
the timeline has been reduced from yearly points to the Scottish election periods, thus removing 
smaller variations in the curves. 
Figure 1 shows the rate of respondents having chosen a pro-independence stance in the interviews 
by their age group. This allows for a variability in group membership: respondents who were in the 
45-64 age range in 1999 could have fallen into the 65-68 range in 2005 and the 69-74 age range in 
2008 (since the SSA is a repeated cross-sectional survey, it is, however, unlikely that the same person 
was interviewed at all of these time points). This perspective thus takes into consideration that the 
respondents’ living circumstances may change with progressing age (and this not just randomly on 
the individual level but systematically, statistically associated with on-setting age, on the macro 
level), allowing for lifecycle effects. To capture these effects accurately, it was decided to divert from 
the conventional age group definitions: just as the 18-24 year-olds are often distinguished as a 
relatively narrow age range in which young people start into a new phase of their lives, it was taken 
into consideration that the phase in life right after retiring from work life may also be such a phase 
of re-adjustment and new beginnings. Additionally, for some, though not all, older adults, there may 
come a time of transition into a less agile (physically, mentally or emotionally) phase of their life. 
Thus it was chosen to differentiate those respondents aged 65 and over more finely into three 
groups: the group aged 65 to 68 years of age that will most likely have just entered retirement (or 
face the fact that they have to work beyond the typical retirement age for whatever reason), the 
group aged 69 to 74 that may be expected to have settled into their lives as pensioners and will for 
the most part still be quite agile, and the group of people aged 75 and over who may increasingly 
experience the effects of old age (according to the Office for National Statistics 2012, men aged 65 
had an average healthy life expectancy of 10.1 years in the UK in 2008-2010; women of 11.6 years).  
Figure 2, on the other hand, is based on fixed membership within the defined groups: it distinguishes 
by year of birth (unfortunately, year of birth is not provided in the SSA, so that an approximation had 
to be calculated based on the indicator ‘age last birthday’). To keep the graph simple, one cohort 
includes a range of twenty birth years, apart from the youngest cohort, which only holds a range of 
twelve years. 
 
Figure 1: Rate of support for Scottish independence in Scottish election periods by age groups  
 
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (SSA) 1999-2012 (without 2008); 5.5% (1,084) missing. 
 
Figure 2: Rate of support for Scottish independence in Scottish election periods by 20 year birth cohorts 
 
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (SSA) 1999-2012 (without 2008); 5.5% (1,084) missing. 2011-
2012 rate for the oldest cohort not presented due to small sample size (n=12). 
Figure 1 shows that most of the age groups’ attitudes towards independence develop in tandem: in 
the 2003-2006 period support for independence increased in all groups, and in the 2007-2010 period 
it decreased in all but the oldest age group before increasing again in all but the 65-68 years old 
group of respondents. Such an observation would point towards the association between age and 
attitude towards Scottish independence being a lifecycle effect: the older a person becomes, the 
more likely they are to want Scotland to remain a part of the UK. Even the differences in the 
development that are also present, such as the slow and continuous increase in the oldest age group 
in contrast to the up and down in the others, or the drastic drop in support in the 65-68 age group in 
20011-2012 would support this: perhaps socio-economic circumstances have changed for these 
groups at those specific points in time, and this led them to make decisions diverging from the 
overall trend. 
However, Figure 2 shows a similar picture for the cohorts: while all cohorts chose the same general 
direction of development over the last 14 years (apart from the youngest cohort in the 2003-2006 
period), and their overall trend is slightly downwards, which would support the lifecycle hypothesis, 
there are some differences in their development, so that the possibility that there are cohort effects 
at play cannot be safely rejected. 
The aim of this paper is thus to explore the nature of the relationship of attitude towards Scottish 
independence and age based on a discussion of possible lifecycle effects and cohort/generational 
effects and binary logistic regression models. Before this step is taken, it has first to be established 
which factors may influence a person’s opinion on how Scotland should be ruled. Here Bert 
Klandermans work on why people join and actively support social movements will be utilised to build 
a theoretical frame. Furthermore, it has to be theorised which of these factors may be regarded as 
cohort effect indicators and which may be regarded as lifecycle effect indicators before it can be 
tested with the help of logistic regression in how far they account for the observed age effect. 
The Social Movements behind the referendum 
Bert Klandermans (2004; with van Stekelenburg 2010) states that participation in social movements 
depends on three elements: demand, supply, and mobilisation. In simplified words, people need to 
want to join a social movement, they need to be provided with the opportunity to do so, and they 
need to be motivated to participate actively. In case of the referendum about Scottish 
independence, there are in fact two social movements aiming to gain a wide base of support and to 
motivate these supporters to go and vote in the referendum on 18th September 2014: the Better 
Together Campaign and the Yes Scotland Campaign. The latter fights for a political – and in 
consequence also economical – change, whereas the first emphasises the advantages of consistency 
in contrast to the perceived risks of splitting from the UK. 
Klandermans identifies three motives for a person to join such a movement, related to the demand 
element: instrumentality, meaning that the movement promises to change something that the 
potential participant wants to change, identity, the feeling of being part of a group of likeminded 
people in which they perhaps can gain a respected position through their contributions, and 
ideology, the expression and spreading of personal views and feelings and the gain of meaning in 
their life. 
When looking at the supporters of Scottish independence, what attracts them to the Pro-
Independence movement can easily be identified: ‘A demand for change begins with dissatisfaction, 
be it the experience of illegitimate inequality, feelings of relative deprivation, feelings of injustice, 
moral indignation about some state of affairs, or a suddenly imposed grievance’ (Klandermans 2004, 
p. 362), and the data of the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey demonstrates this. Throughout, people 
who are in a relatively worse social position or perceive themselves in this manner are more likely to 
favour independence. Economically, this can be seen in their income perception and their main 
income source. 
Looking at subjective income perception, there is a clear trend that the better the respondents got 
by on their income, the less inclined they were towards favouring independence. The SSA asked 
between 2004 and 2009 which phrase came closest to the respondents’ feelings about their income, 
offering five response categories ranging from ‘living very comfortably on present income’ over 
‘coping on present income’ to ‘finding it very difficult on present income’. From the very 
comfortable (23.2%) to the difficult (but not very difficult) response category, there was a twenty 
per cent rise of support for independence; for the age group around the retirement line, support 
even varied from 13.8% to 50%. 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of perception of income by age group in 2001. 
 
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (SSA) 2001. 0.3% missing. 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of perception of income by age group in 2011. 
 
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (SSA) 2011. 0.6% missing. 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 are based on similar indicators with differing question wording and response 
categories from varying years. In both figures there is a clear connection between age and likeliness 
of being able to get by on your present income. This is not necessarily directly related to the actual 
amount of money received each month but rather a subjective measure which may also be 
influenced by previous experience: if they have had to get by on limited income for a while, they 
may find it more comfortable than if they’d had to reduce their spending recently or have yet to 
develop a suitable money management strategy because they are living on their own income for the 
first time. However, while in 2001 the majority of the population stated they were merely coping on 
their present income, in 2011 a majority said they were living comfortably or very comfortably on it. 
While the response categories are not directly comparable – it is possible that had they been offered 
a 5-point scale, some of the respondents in 2001 would have placed themselves in e.g. a 
‘comfortable’ category if those had been more differentiated – the gap between older and younger 
people appears to have widened. The share of people over age 75 who say they have difficulties/are 
struggling on their present income has shrunk to mere three per cent. In contrast, amongst the 18-
24 year-olds it has slightly grown to nearly a quarter. 
A clear association can also be identified with the respondents’ main income source. Amongst 
employees and students depending on grants, loans, or parental help, about three in ten give an 
answer that is positive towards an independent Scotland, roughly matching the average. State 
pensioners (24%) and even more so occupational and private pensioners (20.2%) are more sceptical. 
On the other hand, respondents depending on job seeker’s allowance, income support , or ‘other’ 
income sources have a larger tendency to embrace the idea of a radical constitutional change 
(54.5%, 41.6%, and 38.2% support for the idea respectively). In the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 
1999-2012, the respondents between the ages of 18 to 24 were most likely to state they relied on 
these income forms (7.2% of them received job seeker’s allowance as opposed to merely 2.3% in the 
overall sample). 
Both of these findings suggest that respondents who are not content with their position in the 
current Scottish society are on average more likely to join the Yes campaigners’ side. This can be 
further corroborated by looking at the influence that marital status has. Looking at the overall 
population, there is only a small effect of 5 % difference in the rates of people for Scottish 
independence detectable of whether the respondents live with a partner or not. However, looking at 
the effect in the different age groups presents a sharper picture: while in the youngest and oldest 
age groups living with a partner slightly increases the respondents’ likeliness to favour a split of 
Scotland from the UK, in all other age groups it decreases it. This is most pronounced amongst the 
25-44 year-olds, where 38% of those living without a partner want independence and only 31% of 
those with a partner, as well as in the 45-64 age group (34.3%/27.4%). In the 69-74 group the effect 
nearly disappears before it reverses for those over age 75. 
Furthermore, when cross-tabulating support for Scottish independence with partnership status 
controlling for whether the respondent is employed or a job-seeker, a similar change of effect is 
observable: in the group of respondents in employment between the ages of 18-64, a split from the 
UK is less popular with those living with a partner. Conversely, in the job-seeking group, 61% of 
those living in a partnership favour independence as opposed to 52% of those not living in a 
partnership. 
So being attached, which usually encompasses taking over responsibility for another person’s well-
being, will make the respondent less willing to take the risk of a changing political climate and an 
accompanying potential economic change – if there is something to risk, such as a pension or good 
employment. If, however, due to e.g. a lack of employment or low income the respondents perceive 
themselves as unable to fulfil their responsibilities towards a partner, having one will make them 
more likely to strive for change. 
Group identity, age, and Scottish independence 
The previously discussed findings can be interpreted both in the frame of instrumentality – of 
respondents being in what they perceive as a place of disadvantage trying to change their socio-
political environment to create opportunities for themselves for gaining an improved position within 
a new social order – as well as in the frame of ideology: of an expression of discontent with their 
current situation when supporting independence. The last of the three prerequisites for joining a 
social movement in Klandermans’ theory is the identification with the group. 
There have been several varying indicators introduced in the course of the SSA that aimed to capture 
the feeling of national identity, which seems so crucial when talking about Scottish independence. In 
all years, respondents were asked whether they thought of themselves as Scottish. They were also 
asked to locate themselves on a Moreno national identity scale ranging from ‘British not Scottish’ to 
‘Scottish not British’. The latter indicator is much stronger correlated with support for Scottish 
independence than the first: about four out five respondents identified as Scottish in the binary 
indicator, yet amongst these ‘Scottish’ people, there was a proportion of supporters of 32.4% that 
was only slightly above the overall average. Amongst those identifying as ‘Scottish, not British’ on 
the Moreno scale, on the other hand, one in two favoured an independent Scotland over other 
proposed constitutional arrangements. It is thus not so much the question whether the interviewee 
feels Scottish. The question is if they feel exclusively Scottish: even in the group of respondents 
saying they considered themselves ‘more Scottish than British’, the proportion of independence 
supporters was already slightly below average (29%). 
Another indicator that may be connected to group identity is religious affiliation. Even without a 
measure for how closely connected the respondent is to their local religious community, affiliation 
with a religion may be an indicator of a perception of connection. Indeed, as can be seen in Table 3, 
respondents claiming an affiliation with protestant churches, such as the Church of Scotland, are on 
average around 8% less inclined towards Scottish independence than Roman Catholics or non-
Christian believers, and still 6% beneath the rate of support found in respondents with no religious 
affiliation. Perhaps this is related to Colley’s (1992) argumentation that the shared Protestantism 
was one element in the glue that held the British Empire together; something that emphasises the 
United Kingdom’s shared history and culture, rather than setting Scotland apart. 
 
Table 2: Rate of support for Scottish independence by religious affiliation 
Religious 
affiliation 
Rate of supporters for 
Scottish 
independence 
Church of Scotland 23.5% 
Roman Catholic 35.3% 
Other Christian 23.7% 
Non-Christian 35.6% 
No religion 33.9% 
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (SSA) 1999-2012 (excl. 2008). 5.8% missing. Cramer’s V= 
.115. p<0.001. 
 
Benefits and risks of Scottish independence 
So far in this paper, the personal motivations that may lead people to either want political change or 
hold on to the status quo were explored, as well as the importance of identifying with either of the 
movements that promise to advocate Scotland’s interests. 
However, there is an additional aspect in the decision making process, most prominently voiced by 
authors that follow the rational choice approach (e.g. Olson 1968): the question what a person has 
to gain and what to lose if the movement succeeds. This was explored from an objective perspective 
earlier – someone with a relatively good socio-economic position in the current society or someone 
that depends on political stability for their livelihood (such as pensioners) is less likely to stand in for 
change: they have too much at risk. 
Yet the SSA moved beyond that in recent years and asked a range of questions concerning the 
interviewees’ expectations of an independent Scotland. In 2009, 2011, and 2012, respondents were 
asked to predict if as a result of independence Scotland’s economy would improve, get worse, or 
remain the same. About a third of them expected an improvement, nearly a quarter thought there 
would be no difference, and 21.8% thought it would worsen. About one in ten could not decide. 
Figure 5 shows that the 25 to 74 year olds are predominantly expecting change (to the better or the 
worse), whereas the youngest and the oldest age groups had higher proportions of people expecting 
continuity and of people not knowing what to expect (the latter is already found amongst the 69-74 
year olds). Of the 18-24 year olds who do expect change, 30.6% were counting on a positive 
development and only 23% feared a negative development. 
 
Figure 5: Expectation of development of economy in independent Scotland by age groups 
 
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (SSA) 2009, 2011, 2012. 
 
As Figure 6 shows, on the other hand, occupational and private pensioners are the respondents 
most often stating that they anticipate a worsening of the economy – presumably because they fear 
the consequences for their pension payments –, and they are on average more decisive in their 
opinion than the state pensioners. The latter, in contrast, in fact are less inclined to believe in a 
worsening of the economy were Scotland to become independent than respondents who are in 
employment. Overall, those groups that have already previously been identified as those with 
motivation to wish for a change in the current system – the ones depending on financial support – 
are also the ones expecting the most economic benefits from and perceiving the least risks in 
Scotland turning independent. 
 
Figure 6: Whether respondent thinks that economy in independent Scotland would get better, worse or remain the 
same by main income source 
 
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (SSA) 2009, 2011, 2012. 
A model of support for Scottish independence 
Based on the theoretical deliberations discussed in the first part of this paper, a binary logistic model  
was constructed. To be able to make use of a large sample size, indicators that were only asked 
about in one to four years were not included in the model. This includes all the indicators on 
expectations towards developments in independent Scotland (asked in 2009, 2011 and 2012), as 
well as those on subjective income perception, which varied in their response options too much to 
safely be combined. 
The final model looks at the likelihood of a person supporting Scottish independence based on their 
main income source, religion, national identity, partnership status, as well as their relative income 
position through income quartiles, whether they have A-levels, and their age group. Since the 
information was gathered over a period of fourteen years, the four Scottish election periods were 
introduced as rough control for differences in associations over time. Sex acts as second control 
variable. 
 
Table 3: Regression coefficients of a binary logistic regression of support for Scottish independence 
Variable  B S.E. Exp(B) Variable  B S.E. Exp(B) 
Sex -0.29 0.04 0.75*** Partnership status by main income source       *** 
Religion     ***  Partnership status by employment 0.00   1.00 
Church of 
Scotland 0.00   1.00 
Partnership status by 
occupational and private 
pensions 
0.28 0.17 1.32 
Roman Catholic 0.33 0.07 1.39*** Partnership status by state pensions -0.09 0.11 0.92 
Other Christian 0.33 0.08 1.38*** Partnership status by job seeker's allowance -0.10 0.27 0.91 
Non-Christian 0.93 0.17 2.54*** Partnership status by income support -0.64 0.23 0.53** 
No religion 0.40 0.05 1.49*** Partnership status by student grant/loan or parental support 2.14 0.43 8.50*** 
Income quartiles      *** Partnership status by other income source  0.14 0.15 1.15 
first 0.00   1.00 Main income source      *** 
second -0.13 0.07 0.87 employment 0.00   1.00 
third -0.43 0.08 0.65*** occupational and private pensions -0.33 0.17 0.72 
fourth -0.66 0.08 0.52*** state pensions -0.19 0.12 0.83 
unknown -0.39 0.07 0.68*** job seeker's allowance 0.59 0.15 1.80*** 
National Identity      *** income support 0.12 0.13 1.12 
Scottish not British 2.20 0.14 8.99*** student grant/loan or parental support -0.84 0.17 0.43*** 
More Scottish 
than British 1.40 0.14 4.05*** other income sources 0.04 0.10 1.04 
Equally Scottish 
and British 0.34 0.14 1.40* Age group      *** 
More British than 
Scottish 0.00 0.19 1.00 18-24 0.72 0.13 2.06*** 
British, not 
Scottish 0.00   1.00 25-44 0.55 0.12 1.74*** 
Scottish election 
period      *** 45-64 0.44 0.11 1.56*** 
1999-2002 0.00   1.00 65-68 0.15 0.12 1.16 
2003-2006 0.23 0.05 1.26*** 69-74 0.01 0.12 1.01 
2007-2010 -0.07 0.05 0.94 75+ 0.00   1.00 
2011-2012 0.08 0.06 1.09 Highers/A-levels/equiv. -0.14 0.05 0.87** 
    Constant -2.17 0.20 0.11*** 
Source: SSA 1999-2012 (excl. 2002, 2004, 2008). 12.4% missing. Reference group in italics. 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. Dependent variable is coded 1=support for Scottish independence, 
0=other constitutional preference with Scotland being part of UK. 
Following the observation that being affiliated with the Church of Scotland is associated with a lower 
than average support for independence, this category was chosen as the reference category for 
religious affiliation. For the same reason ‘British, not Scottish’ was the reference category for 
national identity. Employment was the basic category for the main income source, the oldest age 
group of those aged 75 and over for the age groups, and the 1999-2002 span for the Scottish 
election periods. 
Overall, the model reaches a Nagelkerke R² of 0.21. It is not intended to be a holistic model of 
Scottish independence support – due to the limitation in available information, but also because it is 
primarily concerned with one part of Klandermans’  theory (the demand aspect), leaving out other 
considerations, such as how well each of the social movements can convince potential followers that 
they can achieve their goals. 
In comparison to a model based only on age groups and Scottish election periods, the coefficients of 
age have grown smaller in the regression model – some of the other explanatory variables 
apparently accounted for some of the influential power of age on attitudes towards independence. 
Most of them are in some manner associated with age, but which do actually explain the age effect 
in this model? 
Cohort effect and lifecycle effect indicators 
In the previous parts of this paper it was shown that many of the factors influencing a person’s 
attitude towards Scottish independence are associated with age. However, how does this aid in 
answering the question of whether the overall age effect is fuelled by life course phenomena or by 
changes from one cohort to the next? When looking at these factors more closely, some are clearly 
either cohort or life cycle related. 
The main income source with its previously discussed categories is clearly to be regarded as a life 
course related indicator: there is, on the one hand, the binary distinction of work life and retirement 
inherent in it. On the other hand, unemployment and dependency on income support are more 
frequent amongst younger workers. 
Similarly, the partnership status is clearly a life course effect: only one in five of the youngest age 
group lives in a partnership, as opposed to three quarters of the 45 to 54 year-olds. 
Additionally, within the whole Scottish population, women are over five per cent less likely to want 
independent Scotland than men (32.7%). Amongst the youngest age group, the genders are 
balanced, whereas in the population over 65 years, 57% are female due to the longer lifespan of the 
female population. 
Religiosity, on the other hand, is clearly a matter of cohort differences: Voas (2009) has argued that 
loss of religiosity does not typically occur in the course of one person’s life but rather that religiosity 
is not successfully handed down from one generation to the next. Additionally, migration can 
increase the rate, e.g. of non-Christian religions. In Table 4, the rise of atheism and agnosticism over 
the established churches from one 20-year-cohort is plainly visible. 
Table 4: Religious affiliation by cohort. 
  
1903-1922 1923-1942 1943-1962 1963-1982 1983-1994 
Church of Scotland 58.2% 51.0% 31.5% 15.3% 8.2% 
Roman Catholic 12.2% 12.6% 13.0% 13.1% 10.0% 
Other Christian 12.0% 12.3% 11.0% 9.8% 10.6% 
Non-Christian .4% .6% 1.2% 2.7% 4.1% 
No religion 17.2% 23.6% 43.2% 59.1% 67.0% 
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (SSA) 1999-2012 (excl. 2008). Cramer’s V = .184. p<0.001. 
The respondent’s level of education could also reasonably be called a cohort effect: over the course 
of the last century, the average time spent in education rose steadily, which was supported by 
raising the school leaving age from 14 to 16 in Scotland in 1973 and several reforms of Leaving 
Certificates and an expansion of the university system. Respondents are more open for Scottish 
independence if they have no A-levels. The highest rate of support is found amongst those with 
standard grades 4-7/CSE or an equivalent qualification (35%), while university graduates were least 
convinced of the benefits of an independent country (21.9%). This relation is found throughout all 
age groups; however, if it is taken into consideration that older people are more likely to have low 
educational qualifications and these are associated with higher support for independence, there 
would be expected to be more support for independence amongst the older population, not less. 
Therefore, other effects have apparently counteracted whatever influence education may exert. 
The second indicator for the identification with a group after religion, the Moreno scale indicator of 
national identity, in contrast does work in the direction that helps explain the age differences in the 
attitude towards Scottish independence: 38.2% of the 18-24 year olds chose the response category 
‘Scottish, not British’, but only about three in ten respondents over 45 did so – and this category is 
most strongly associated with support for independence, whereas a great majority of the  
respondents feeling ‘More British than Scottish’ or ‘British, not Scottish’ support the Better together 
camp (90.6%/89.8%). 
Tilley and Heath (2007) argue that British national pride is on the decline, and they regard this as a 
generational effect. As did Colley, they see the former strength in British national identity springing 
from the past success of the British worldwide empire (including a rival on the other side of the 
Channel that needed to be united against), the shared religion that sets Britain apart from all other 
people, and its economic prosperity and leading role in the establishment of a welfare state. With 
McCrone (1997), they point out that many of these elements have diminished: the empire has fallen 
apart, religion is (as previously shown) growing less and less important, and Britain is only one 
member in a group of well-developed social welfare states - and not the one with the strongest 
economy or military power. 
In an ordinary least square regression in which they controlled for a range of variables, including 
religion, age when the respondents ended their education, and the respondents’ social class, they 
found that even when accounting for all these factors, many of which themselves are associated 
with cohort differences as mentioned in this paper, the authors still found a significant impact of 
‘generation’ (10 year birth cohorts) on national pride. 
While the SSA does not measure national pride, it does offer a binary indicator of whether the 
respondents feel British at all. This indeed does show a decline of feeling British starting in the 
cohort born in the middle of the last century. 
 
Table 5: Feeling British by 20-year-cohort 
  1903-
1922 
1923-
1942 
1943-
1962 
1963-
1982 
1983-
1994 
Does the 
respondent think of 
themself as British?  
54.6% 54.4% 54.4% 47.3% 41.5% 
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (SSA) 1999-2012 (excl. 2008). 0.4% missing. 
Controlling for cohort and lifecycle indicators 
To check for cohort and lifecycle effects, two separate models were created from the first one: each 
with two explanatory variables that have previously been discussed as relatively safe indicators 
either for cohort effects or for lifecycle effects. For the cohort model, national identity and religious 
affiliation were selected; for the lifecycle model, main income source and partnership status were 
chosen. Both models contained the control for the time period in which the data was collected and 
the age groups. 
The aim in building these two models and comparing them was to see in which of these models the 
age group coefficients would be reduced. A reduction of the coefficient would point towards these 
variables being linked to the observed age effect. 
In logistic regression, the exponentiated beta coefficient (exp[B]) expresses the odds ratio (OR): for 
example, each age group is entered separately into the regression, allowing to say that the 
respondent either is in this age group or is not in this age group. The OR is the ratio of the odds of 
this person favouring Scottish independence in the given age group over the odds of them favouring 
Scottish independence if they were in the reference group. Were the odds entirely even, the OR 
would equal one. If the odds of supporting independence are smaller than the odds of not doing so, 
the OR would be smaller than one but bigger than zero. If they are larger, the OR would be bigger 
than one. In these models, the oldest age group was elected to be the reference group, and since it 
has the smallest support rate for Scottish independence, the odds of doing so in any of the other 
groups are larger – leading to an exponentiated beta coefficient above one. For a reduction of the 
coefficient, it would – counter-intuitively – have to move closer to one (not zero). 
 
Table 6: Coefficients (exp[B]) for age groups in 4 binary logistic regression models of support for Scottish independence 
 age model 
full 
model 
cohort 
model 
lifecycle 
model 
ag
e 
gr
ou
p 
18-24 2.53*** 2.07*** 1.94*** 2.56*** 
25-44 2.04*** 1.74*** 1.65*** 1.96*** 
45-64 1.70*** 1.56*** 1.53*** 1.66*** 
65-68 1.24 1.16 1.13 1.26* 
69-74 1.03 1.01 1.0 1.05 
missing 5.7% 12.4% 10.6% 6.6% 
Nagelkerke R² 0.02 0.21 0.18 0.04 
-2*log likelihood 18421 15080 15636 18102 
Source: SSA 1999-2012 (excl. 2002, 2004, 2008). ***p<0.001, *p<0.05 
Table 6 shows the odds ratios of the age groups for all four models – the model only including age 
groups controlled by time periods, the full nine indicators model, the cohort and the lifecycle model. 
In the regression on age groups, the odds of supporting independence in the youngest age group are 
about one and a half times higher than in the oldest age group. The regression with nine explanatory 
variables reduced this coefficient to just over two and also reduced the OR of the other age groups, 
albeit to a lesser degree. 
However, while, as was shown in Table 3, for each of the nine variables inserted into the regression 
at least some dummy indicators were significantly associated with the dependent variable, according 
to its Nagelkerke R Square value the cohort regression model with its four independent variables 
explained nearly as much as the full model with nine. Moreover, it reduced the impact of age even 
further, pushing the OR between youngest and oldest age group to just under two. In stark contrast, 
the life cycle regression model brought no noteworthy change to the age group coefficients. 
It has to be annotated that despite the large sample sizes between n=14,283 (full model) and 
n=15,385 (age group model) the 95% confidence intervals of the age group coefficients of all models 
have overlaps. So for the youngest age group the 95% confidence interval of the exponentiated beta 
coefficient is 1.60 – 2.35 in the cohort model and 2.13 – 3.01 in the age group model. However, 
these large intervals are produced by splitting up the sample into different age groups. If instead the 
age and cohort logistic regression models are run with a continuous age variable, the 95% 
confidence intervals are close but mutually exclusive (using a categorical age variable instead of a 
continuous one in the main body of this paper was chosen because the age effect was more 
apparent when measured in units of several years rather than in one year units and because this 
would have allowed for variations of the effect between age groups). 
The here presented results thus suggest that the association between age and attitude towards 
Scottish independence displayed in Table 1 is at least partly originating in cohort differences. 
However, the age effect was diminished by only about a third of its size. That means the evidence 
suggests that there is a cohort effect at play, yet it is not certain if there is not also some lifecycle 
influence exerted by factors that could not be examined with the given data. 
 
Conclusions 
In this paper, the origins of the association between attitudes towards Scottish independence and 
age, which have been subject to the public debate in light of the 2014 referendum, were addressed. 
Two distinct explanations for the apparent association were explored: cohort effects and lifecycle 
effects. 
With the help of Klandermans’ theory about why people join social movements and actively engage 
in them, some key factors in explaining why respondents favoured independence over other forms 
of ruling Scotland in the interviews were identified. People that had a comparatively bad socio-
economic position, such as those living on job-seekers’ allowance or individuals finding it hard to get 
by on their present income, and little to risk, were less likely to hold on to the status quo. Looking at 
expectations towards a future in an independent Scotland revealed that hope for a positive 
economic development is wider spread in these parts of the population, suggesting that they count 
on an improvement of their social and financial position were Scotland to become independent and 
at the same time do not have much to risk through it. This makes the referendum (and the campaign 
supporting it) instrumental in achieving a betterment of their circumstances, while at the same time 
it enables them to raise awareness for their discontent. Unsurprisingly, it was also established that 
national identity is a good measurement for whether respondents identify with the goal of 
independence, finding that it is not feeling Scottish per se but feeling predominantly or exclusively 
Scottish that sways them to favour this form of constitution. 
Subsequently, for each of the two possible explanations of the age effect, two matching indicators 
were identified in the model: it was argued that the cohort effect was associated with religious 
affiliation and national identity, while the lifecycle effect was associated with the respondent’s 
partnership status and their main income source. Two reduced regressions were conducted based 
on these indicators, a time control, and a categorical age measure and compared against a model 
without the cohort and lifecycle indicators. It was found that the cohort indicators accounted for 
about a third of the age group difference, while the odds ratio of support for independence between 
the age groups remained approximately the same in the lifecycle model. The results thus point 
towards a cohort effect. At the same time, since the shown cohort effect could only reduce, not 
entirely replace, the age influence, it cannot be ruled out that there is also a lifecycle effect involved. 
Overall, this paper could only look at the first aspect in Klandermans’ theory of demand, supply and 
mobilisation. It did not examine how well each of the campaigns are organised or how they are 
perceived by the potential voters, which would tell more about the supply element. The SSA also 
does not provide any indication towards the mobilisation of voters: it does not offer an ‘undecided’ 
option when asking how Scotland should be ruled, and it would find it hard to receive a reliable 
answer were it to ask if the respondent is likely to take part in the referendum (since for a part of the 
population this will be a decision made a few hours, days or weeks before the referendum, not 
years) – a factor that itself is discussed both as lifecycle and as cohort effect (e.g. Bhatti and Hansen 
2011, Konzelmann, Wagner and Rattinger 2011). Furthermore, our model looked at the socio-
economic reasons the respondents of the SSA may have for wanting Scottish independence, 
especially so in the lifecycle model. However, attitudes are not solely rooted in individual 
calculations; they are influenced by a social discourse (a small part of which is captured when 
looking at national identity) and by the opinions of an individual’s social network. Especially when a 
person is embedded in a social network where there is a clear opinion about Scottish independence 
communicated, this may sway them (Kitts 2000). With the available data, it cannot be determined 
whether people of all ages and all cohorts have equal chances of being part in a social network that 
is strongly for (or against) Scottish independence, or which influence the media channels they 
consume have. 
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